Know-how as competence

What does it mean to know how to do something? This book develops a comprehensive account of know-how, a crucial epistemic goal for all who care about getting things right, not only with respect to the facts, but also with respect to practice. It proposes a novel interpretation of the seminal work of Gilbert Ryle, according to which know-how is a competence, a complex ability to do well in an activity in virtue of guidance by an understanding of what it takes to do so. This idea is developed into a full-fledged account, Rylean responsibilism, which understands know-how in terms of the normative guidance and responsible control of one's acts. Within the complex current debate about know-how, this view occupies a middle ground position between the intellectualist claim that know-how just is propositional or objectual knowledge and the anti-intellectualist claim that know-how just is ability. In genuine know-how, practical ability and guiding intellect are both necessary, but essentially intertwined. „Es [ist] zu hoffen, dass Löwensteins Buch von vielen gelesen wird. [...] Es ist ein Beispiel hervorragender analytischer Philosophie, die sich nicht von Ismen und Debatten blenden lässt, sondern zu grundlegenden Fragen zurückkehrt.“ Hannes Worthmann, in: Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie