Philippa Foot was a British philosopher renowned for her contributions to ethics. Her work centered on ethical theories, particularly virtue ethics, exploring the nature of moral good and bad. Foot was instrumental in reviving Aristotelian traditions within modern moral philosophy. Her thought has shaped the understanding of moral principles and their practical application.
Focusing on the critique of prominent ethical theories, this collection of essays by Philippa Foot spans her influential work from the late 1970s to the 1990s. It addresses key themes such as moral judgment, practical rationality, and the tensions between virtue, desire, and self-interest. This volume serves as a crucial link between her previous and later works, showcasing Foot's significant impact on twentieth-century moral philosophy and her exploration of complex moral dilemmas.
Philippa Foot critiques contemporary moral theories, developing her own perspective that challenges both emotivism and prescriptivism. Her work emphasizes the importance of virtue ethics, arguing for a moral framework grounded in human nature and practical reasoning. Foot's distinctive approach highlights the significance of moral values and the role of reason in ethical decision-making, making her contributions pivotal in the evolution of moral philosophy.
Focusing on the centrality of virtues and vices in ethical theory, this collection features a dozen essays by Foot that advocate for an ethic of virtue over traditional concepts like rights and justice. The volume includes two new essays and covers topics such as abortion, euthanasia, and the ethical perspectives of Hume and Nietzsche. It also reflects her increasing skepticism towards emotivism and prescriptivism. Foot's clear writing style complements her subtle and thought-provoking arguments, making this work significant in contemporary ethics.