Focusing on the philosophical debate surrounding universals, the book explores its historical roots beginning with medieval definitions. It delves into the ongoing conflict between naturalists and ontologists, examining how contemporary perspectives have evolved. Through this analysis, the author sheds light on the complexities and implications of the existence of universals in philosophical discourse.
Exploring the philosophical foundations of existentialism, this book delves into the revolutionary ideas of Husserl, Heidegger, and Sartre, while also examining the contributions of earlier thinkers like Descartes, Brentano, and Kierkegaard. It highlights Descartes's view of the mind, Brentano's intentionality, and Kierkegaard's focus on dread, situating these discussions within the broader historical context of existence and essence, tracing the debate back to Aquinas and Aristotle.
The book, first published in 1999, is part of the Routledge imprint, known for its academic and scholarly works. It offers insights into its specific subject matter, contributing to ongoing discussions and research in its field. The publisher, Taylor & Francis, emphasizes the book's relevance and quality, ensuring it reaches a broad audience interested in academic topics.
Reinhardt Grossmann argues that a realistic ontology in regard to perceptual, physical, and mathematical objects can be combined with an empiricistic theory of knowledge. In the first part of the book he shows that the traditional distinction between primary and secondary qualities leads to idealism, while the common Cartesian conception of knowledge by way of ideas leads to scepticism. In order to avoid these twin scourges of modern philosophy, the authors argues for the existence of ordinary perceptual objects and explains how we know these objects directly through simple acts of perception. The second part of the book is concerned with the way in which we know what is in our minds. Grossmann maintains that this kind of knowledge is just as fallible as perception. In the third part the author concludes that logic, arithmetic, and set theory concern matters of facts and that we discover these facts empirically.