The book explores the necessity of a constitutional social contract among a firm's stakeholders for its survival as a social institution. It addresses two key issues: identifying the terms of a hypothetical agreement from an ex ante perspective and examining the endogenous mechanisms that create incentives for compliance with this social contract from an ex post perspective. Through this analysis, it highlights the importance of stakeholder relationships in justifying the institution's existence.
Lorenzo Sacconi Book order




- 2012
- 2010
Corporate Social Responsibility and Corporate Governance
The Contribution of Economic Theory and Related Disciplines
- 484 pages
- 17 hours of reading
The book explores corporate social responsibility through a multi-stakeholder perspective in corporate governance. It delves into various theories, including neo-institutional and stakeholder theories, as well as new rational choice and social contract models. Additionally, it discusses self-regulatory frameworks and soft law approaches, incorporating insights from behavioral economics to provide a comprehensive understanding of the evolving landscape of corporate responsibility.
- 2000
The social contract of the firm
- 229 pages
- 9 hours of reading
In order to survive as a social institution a firm needs a constitutional social contract, even though implicit, among its stakeholders. This social contract must exist if an institution is to be justified. The book focuses on two main issues: To find out the terms of the hypothetical agreement among the firm's stakeholders in an ex ante perspective and to understand the endogenous mechanism generating appropriate incentives that induce to comply with the social contract itself, as seen in the ex post perspective. TOC: Preface.- Acknowledgements.- 1 An Overview of the Theory: Hierarchies, Social Contract and Reputation.- 2 Economic Theory and the Social Contract of the Firm.- 3 Games of Reputation and Compliance with the Social Contract.- 4 How Far Does Reputation Extend? Abuse of Authority and Corporate Culture.- 5 Information, Incomplete Contracts and the Ethical Code.- 6 Dealing with Vagueness of Norms: The Theory of Fuzzy Sets.- 7 A Game Theoretic Model of Incomplete Contract and Ethical Code.- 8 Ethical Decision-making Procedure: Vagueness, Default Reasoning and Reputation.- References.- Names Index.- (more detailed table of contents, see Internet)