Focusing on the intersection of law, economics, and political science, this concise introduction serves as a guide for economists, lawyers, and political scientists. It explores traditional literature on legal families and microeconomic analysis of legal rules from a comparative viewpoint. Additionally, it examines global court systems and integrates insights from comparative judicial politics, making it a valuable resource for understanding the complexities of comparative law and economics.
Anyone interested in the future of democracy needs to understand the role of
international law in resisting or facilitating authoritarianism. As the
balance of power between democracies and authoritarians shifts, it will have
consequences for the international legal order.
Democracies face significant threats as populist leaders rise globally, undermining democratic self-rule. The election of Donald Trump in the U.S. exemplifies this shift, raising concerns about the erosion of democratic norms. The authors argue that while the Constitution provides safeguards, complacency is no longer an option. Drawing on international examples of democratic backsliding, they illustrate how constitutional rules can either support or hinder the decline of democratic institutions. Key elements like checks and balances, a vibrant civil society, and individual rights, such as those in the First Amendment, may not effectively protect against democratic erosion. Instead, the authors suggest that the Constitution's design can inadvertently make decline more probable. Its rigidity has empowered the Supreme Court to interpret laws in ways that may facilitate rights infringements. Even the First Amendment can be weaponized by skilled communicators to degrade public discourse. The authors advocate for proactive measures to enhance laws and constitutional design, aiming to mitigate the risks of democratic decline and improve the resilience of democracies worldwide.
