This book explores the classic free will problem and its implications for moral responsibility. Published in 1987, it argues that the core issue is metaphysical, questioning whether scientific laws can establish necessary connections between actions and their causes. The author concludes they cannot.
Focusing on determinism, Bernard Berofsky presents a constructive perspective that enriches the libertarian-determinist debate. His analysis appeals to readers seeking a deeper comprehension of this metaphysical doctrine, particularly regarding human responsibility and the challenges that determinism may pose to it. The book is a thought-provoking exploration for anyone interested in the implications of determinism on accountability and moral agency.
The book presents a comprehensive analysis of autonomy, challenging traditional philosophical views that equate it with self-origination. Professor Berofsky argues that this notion is misleading and emphasizes the importance of psychology in understanding autonomy. He critiques established concepts like moral autonomy and self-realization, proposing a new model centered on active, competent engagement with the world, free from psychological and physiological constraints. This fresh perspective aims to redefine autonomy in a more practical and liberating context.