Carl von Clausewitz Books

First translation into English of Clausewitz's most important campaign history, which offers key insights into his theoretical classic On War.

Covers the period of Napoleon's invasion of Egypt and focuses on the Second Coalition's campaign in Italy and their victories under Suvorov's dynamic leadership that carried the tide of battle up against the French frontier. This first English translation of volume 5 of Clausewitz's collected works conveys the character of Clausewitz's writing in all its registers.

Exploring the political and historical writings of Carl von Clausewitz, this companion volume to On War presents previously untranslated works that shed light on his theories of war and European perspectives during the Napoleonic era. The collection includes a restored text that had been censored, alongside insightful introductions by the editors that contextualize Clausewitz's innovative historical analysis and political commentary. His independent and pragmatic approach to state power and social issues offers a compelling view of his time, making this volume a significant contribution to understanding his legacy.

The TREDITION CLASSICS series focuses on reviving public domain literature, emphasizing the timeless nature of great books. It aims to make these works accessible in printed format globally. The initiative is supported by various non-profit literature projects, with a portion of proceeds from each sale donated to these causes. By choosing a TREDITION CLASSICS book, readers contribute to preserving significant literary works for future generations.

"War is not merely a political act, but also a real political instrument, a continuation of political commerce, a carrying out of the same by other means." -Carl von Clausewitz, On War, 1832 On War is Carl von Clausewitz' masterpiece on war and military strategy, which was written between 1816 and 1830 and was published posthumously by his wife Marie von Clausewitz (née von Brühl) in 1832. Three main concepts of war stand out: war should be seen as an instrument of politics; the military objectives in war that support one's political objectives fall into two types: "war to achieve limited aims" and war to "disarm" the enemy; and the course of war will tend to favor the party with the stronger emotional and political motivations, but especially the defender. This edition is the classical translation of On War (1873) by Col. J.J. Graham, with an introduction and notes by Colonel F.N. Maude, published in three volumes. A must-read for military historians and theorists, policy makers, and anyone interested in understanding the philosophy and concepts of war.

The Battle of Waterloo has been studied and dissected so extensively that one might assume little more on the subject could be discovered. Now historian Peter Hofschröer brings forward a long-repressed commentary written by Carl von Clausewitz, the author of On War. Clausewitz, the Western world’s most renowned military theorist, participated in the Waterloo campaign as a senior staff officer in the Prussian army. His appraisal, offered here in an up-to-date and readable translation, criticized the Duke of Wellington’s actions. Lord Liverpool sent his translation of the manuscript to Wellington, who pronounced it a “lying work.” The translated commentary was quickly buried in Wellington’s private papers, where it languished for a century and a half. Now published for the first time in English, Hofschröer brings Clausewitz’s critique back into view with thorough annotation and contextual explanation. Peter Hofschröer, long recognized as a leading scholar of the Napoleonic Wars, shows how the Duke prevented the account’s publication during his lifetime—a manipulation of history so successful that almost two centuries passed before Clausewitz’s work reemerged, finally permitting a reappraisal of key events in the campaign. In addition to translating and annotating Clausewitz’s critique, Hofschröer also includes an order of battle and an extensive bibliography.

A sharply-observed study of one of the major turning points in history. A superb first-hand account from an officer on the Russian Imperial Staff. Includes a detailed examination of the Battle of Borodino.

On June 23, 1812, Napoleon's Grande Armée, over 500,000 men strong, poured over the Russian border. An equally massive Russian army faced them. The ensuing campaign was a catastrophe for Napoleon. Although the battle of Borodino, which resulted in heavy losses on both sides, allowed Napoleon to enter Moscow, his stay in that empty and decimated city was disastrous. By the time Napoleon had retreated to the Berezina river in late November, his Grande Armée was only a fifth of its original strength. His retreat had become a rout, and his allies began to desert him. In this book, Clausewitz analyzes all the significant players with sharp and enlightening characterizations, and provides perhaps the best eyewitness accounts of the battle of Borodino and the Convention of Tauroggen. The Campaign of 1812 in Russia is a brilliantly observed study of one of the major turning points of history.

In both a philosophical and a practical work, Clausewitz defines the essential nature of war, debates the qualities of a great commander, assesses the relative strengths of defensive and offensive war, and - in highly controversial passages - considers the relationship between war and politics.