Is there a "science of history"? Must historians be scientists? What is "history" anyway? Celebrated researchers and historians--including Pulitzer-Prize winner John Lewis Gaddis and Nobel laureate Murray Gell-Mann--debate these complex questions in this thoughtful collection of essays.
A collection of essays by a leading American authority on US foreign policy, which discusses the American style of diplomacy of the 20th century, the ambiguous nature of morality in American foreign policy, various aspects of Cold War diplomacy and the end of the Cold War itself.
Focusing on George F. Kennan, a pivotal yet complex figure in Cold War history, this biography explores his role in formulating the U.S. strategy to contain the Soviet Union through the influential "long telegram" and "X" article. The author, a leading historian, offers an in-depth look at Kennan's life, utilizing exclusive access to his archives. The narrative reveals the contradictions in Kennan's thoughts and actions, providing insight into a man whose life and ideas significantly impacted the course of the twentieth century.
Carrying the history of containment through the end of the Cold War, this book begins with Franklin D Roosevelt's postwar plans. It provides an analysis of George F Kennan's original strategy of containment, NSC-68, The Eisenhower- Dulles New Look, and provides an assessment of how Reagan and... číst celé
September 11, 2001, distinguished Cold War historian John Lewis Gaddis argues, was not the first time a surprise attack shattered American assumptions about national security and reshaped American grand strategy. The pattern began in 1814, when the British Army attacked Washington, burning the White House and the Capitol. This early violation of American homeland security gave rise to a strategy of unilateralism and preemption, best articulated by John Quincy Adams, aimed at maintaining strength beyond challenge throughout the North American continent. It remained in place for over a century. Only when Japan attacked Pearl Harbour in 1941 did the inadequacies of this strategy become evident: as a consequence, the administration of Franklin D. Roosevelt devised a new grand strategy of cooperation with allies on an intercontinental scale to defect authoritarianism. That strategy defined the American approach throughout World War II and the Cold War. The terrorist attacks of 9/11, Gaddis writes, made it clear that this strategy was now insufficient to ensure American security. The Bush administration has, therefore, devised a new grand strategy whose foundations lie in the nineteenth-
Focusing on the pivotal events and key figures of the Cold War, this comprehensive account reveals the transition from U.S.-U.S.S.R. alliance to fierce rivalry. Utilizing newly available archives and firsthand accounts, John Lewis Gaddis delves into critical moments like the Cuban Missile Crisis and the interactions between leaders such as Nixon, Mao, Reagan, and Gorbachev. The narrative is both engaging and insightful, capturing the era's dramatic essence and its lasting impact on contemporary global dynamics.
This book moves beyond the focus on economic considerations that was central to the work of New Left historians, examining the many other forces-domestic politics, bureaucratic inertia, quirks of personality, and perceptions of Soviet intentions-that influenced key decision makers in Washington. schovat popis
Did the Soviet Union want world revolution? Why did the USSR send missiles to Cuba? What made the Cold War last as long as it did? The end of the Cold War makes it possible, for the first time, to begin writing its history from a truly international perspective. Based on the latest findings of Cold War historians and extensive research in American archives as well as the recently opened archives in Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union, and China, We Now Know provides a vividly written, eye-opening account of the Cold War during the years from the end of World War II to its most dangerous moment, the Cuban missile crisis.We Now Know stands as a powerful vindication of US policy throughout the period, and as a thought-provoking reassessment of the Cold War by one of its most distinguished historians.
“The best education in grand strategy available in a single volume . . . a book that should be read by every American leader or would-be leader.”—The Wall Street Journal A master class in strategic thinking, distilled from the legendary program the author has co-taught at Yale for decades John Lewis Gaddis, the distinguished historian of the Cold War, has for almost two decades co-taught grand strategy at Yale University with his colleagues Charles Hill and Paul Kennedy. Now, in On Grand Strategy, Gaddis reflects on what he has learned. In chapters extending from the ancient world through World War II, Gaddis assesses grand strategic theory and practice in Herodotus, Thucydides, Sun Tzu, Octavian/Augustus, St. Augustine, Machiavelli, Elizabeth I, Philip II, the American Founding Fathers, Clausewitz, Tolstoy, Lincoln, Wilson, Franklin D. Roosevelt, and Isaiah Berlin. On Grand Strategy applies the sharp insights and wit readers have come to expect from Gaddis to times, places, and people he’s never written about before. For anyone interested in the art of leadership, On Grand Strategy is, in every way, a master class.
