German hyperinflation 1922/23

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The traditional view positions the German Hyperinflation as a precursor to Hitler’s Nazi Regime, yet there is a lack of legal and economic literature addressing the rapid escalation of inflation from July to November 1923. This research challenges the notion that the hyperinflation was solely caused by insufficient taxation, excessive war bonds from WWI, post-war reparations, or social and political unrest. The end of the hyperinflation was achieved through legal measures, including rulings from the German Supreme Court and parliamentary decisions on the conversion rate from Mark to Reichsmark, based on valorism rather than nominalism. While this approach was not entirely equitable, it was deemed the best solution given the socio-economic context. Additionally, monetary actions by the German Reserve Bank, such as the introduction of the Rentenmark—a new currency backed by state land—helped restore trust and could serve as a model for addressing hyperinflation in both developed and developing nations. However, the swift acceleration of hyperinflation remains enigmatic and unpredictable. The research suggests that understanding the transformation from inflation to hyperinflation is a complex phenomenon, warranting further exploration within complexity economics and related fields like mass hysteria and social dynamics.