Models and Methods for Interval-Valued Cooperative Games in Economic Management

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This book presents interval-valued solution concepts for interval-valued cooperative games with transferable utility, examining their properties, models, methods, and applications. The first chapter introduces interval-valued least square solutions along with quadratic programming models and their properties. It then details satisfactory-degree-based non-linear programming models for calculating interval-valued cores and outlines a corresponding bisection algorithm. The exploration continues with various simplification methods for interval-valued solutions, including equal division and equal surplus division values, as well as the interval-valued Shapley, egalitarian Shapley, discounted Shapley, solidarity, generalized solidarity, and Banzhaf values. Targeting a diverse audience from fields such as decision science, game theory, management science, operations research, fuzzy mathematics, applied mathematics, industrial engineering, finance, and artificial intelligence, this book serves as a valuable resource for teachers, postgraduates, and researchers involved in decision analysis, management, systems engineering, project management, supply chain management, and hydrology, among others.