This concise survey of the questions, methods, and empirical findings central to constitutional political economy fills a gap in the literature of political economy. Voigt, a pioneer of the field, demonstrates how constitutional rules affect political economy, appealing to both scholars of the field and readers with no familiarity of the topic.
This book offers a thorough introduction to new institutional economics, highlighting both established knowledge and areas that require further exploration. It aims to clarify complex concepts while addressing the limitations of existing frameworks, making it a valuable resource for students and scholars seeking to understand the evolution and challenges within this economic perspective.
Increased international interdependence - globalization - has also greatly increased the potential for international conflict in various areas such as trade, competition, the environment, and human rights. Observers have counted up to 40 international courts that serve to settle such conflicts. What are adequate criteria to measure the effectiveness of international courts? What factors explain the differences in their success? What factors explain the differences of nation-state governments in delegating competence to international courts in the first place? Should there be any additional courts? This volume assembles ten papers and comments that contain first steps in answering these questions. Their authors are legal scholars and economists, but also political scientists and philosophers. With this volume the „Jahrbuch für Neue Politische Ökonomie“ has changed its title to „Conferences on New Political Economy“.
"Making European Merger Policy More Predictable" by Voigt and Schmidt examines the predictability of European Merger Control and its impact on market economies. The authors highlight significant shortcomings in predictability due to globalization and inconsistent application of economic theory. They propose improvements and assess recent reforms in this area.