Now in its 7th edition, this comprehensive account delves into the failed American effort to establish a non-Communist state in Southern Vietnam. Unlike typical histories that focus solely on diplomatic or military aspects, this volume synthesizes both perspectives, offering a deeper understanding of the complexities surrounding U.S. involvement in Vietnam. It examines the motivations behind the American commitment to halting the spread of Communism in Indochina and the reasons for their ultimate failure. The new edition by George Donelson Moss expands on critical moments of the Vietnam War and its aftermath, including the strategic and diplomatic context of U.S. involvement during World War II, the French reassertion of control in Southern Vietnam in 1945, the formation of SEATO, and the Sino-Vietnamese War of 1979. Additionally, the text has been revised to incorporate recent scholarly literature on the period. Its accessible writing style allows students to grasp the complexities of why the United States engaged in conflict with the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the reasons behind its loss in this protracted struggle. This book appeals to students and scholars of American history, foreign relations, and the Vietnam War.
