More about the book
Annotation In this book, Michael Slote offers the first full-scale foundational account of virtue ethics to have appeared since the recent revival of interest in the topic. Slote advocates a particular form of such ethics for its intuitive and structural advantages over Kantianism, utilitarianism, and common-sense morality, and he argues that the problems of other views can be avoided and a contemporary plausible version of virtue ethics achieved only by abandoning specifically moral concepts for general aretaic notions like admirability and virtue. The book defends a distinctive, intuitive, and symmetric ethical principle according to which we should balance self-concern with concern for others, but it also concludes that there is, contrary to utilitarianism, no single basis for status as a virtue nor any simple relation between the virtues and human well-being
Book purchase
From Morality to Virtue, Michael Slote
- Language
- Released
- 1995
- product-detail.submit-box.info.binding
- (Paperback)
Payment methods
We’re missing your review here.
- Title
- From Morality to Virtue
- Language
- English
- Authors
- Michael Slote
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press on Demand
- Released
- 1995
- Format
- Paperback
- Pages
- 296
- ISBN10
- 0195093925
- ISBN13
- 9780195093926
- Series
- Rating
- 3 out of 5
- Description
- Annotation In this book, Michael Slote offers the first full-scale foundational account of virtue ethics to have appeared since the recent revival of interest in the topic. Slote advocates a particular form of such ethics for its intuitive and structural advantages over Kantianism, utilitarianism, and common-sense morality, and he argues that the problems of other views can be avoided and a contemporary plausible version of virtue ethics achieved only by abandoning specifically moral concepts for general aretaic notions like admirability and virtue. The book defends a distinctive, intuitive, and symmetric ethical principle according to which we should balance self-concern with concern for others, but it also concludes that there is, contrary to utilitarianism, no single basis for status as a virtue nor any simple relation between the virtues and human well-being




